Welcome! I am a PhD Candidate in Finance at HEC Paris.
I am on the 2026-2027 academic job market.
My research focuses on Financial Technology, particularly Decentralized Finance and Blockchain Economics, as well as Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance.
During Spring 2026, I visited the University of Washington (Foster), hosted by Professor Doron Levit.
You can reach me at: romain.rossello@hec.edu.
Presentations: UW Foster, AFA 2027 (Poster), CEPR Paris Symposium (poster), Aarhus Finance Forum 2026, Warwick PhD Workshop on FinTech 2025, 2nd Knut Wicksell Conference on Crypto and Fintech, ToDeFi 2025, CIF University of Basel, HEC Paris
Abstract: Using Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) as a laboratory, I study the limits of expanding shareholder involvement in corporate decision-making. I find that low participation among small shareholders allows large shareholders to impose voting outcomes. I further show that this concentration of control is self-reinforcing. When large shareholders first impose outcomes, small shareholders learn that subsequent decisions are unlikely to reflect their preferences, share prices drop, and small shareholders further disengage from governance. I rationalize these findings with a model in which large shareholders' voting behavior signals whether their interests align with those of small shareholders. Structural estimation of the model suggests that, in expansive shareholder democracies, large shareholders extract private benefits when they impose their preferred outcomes.
Abstract: Shareholders' willingness to pay for voting rights is predicted to depend on both pivotality and individual voter characteristics. We exploit granular voting data, and heterogeneity in the proposal subjects across Decentralized Finance (DeFi) platforms, to isolate which characteristics affect the voters' valuation of voting rights. Voters' preferences matter. Within a proposal, voters opposing the prevailing outcome are willing to pay 17% more for voting rights ex-ante than those supporting it. Past voting experience also matters. Prior participation in high-consensus votes reduces subsequent willingness to pay for voting rights, whereas prior participation in low-consensus votes increases it. This is consistent with voters learning about their relative pivotality. Wealth increases willingness to pay for voting rights, whereas, conditional on wealth, portfolio diversification reduces it. We further show that greater pivotality can either amplify or attenuate the effect of a characteristic on willingness to pay for voting rights. Attenuation especially occurs when the proposal's outcome that creates the effect in the first place induces large financial costs for voters.
Abstract: This paper studies the financial policy of stablecoin issuers: how they are funded and how they distribute reserves. We document that issuers with similar business activities may adopt similar policies (MakerDAO and Aave) or very different ones (Tether and Circle). We rationalize this pattern with a model in which the return earned on reserves is a fundamental characteristic that differs between on-chain and off-chain issuers. The higher return available to off-chain issuers exacerbates agency frictions and, in turn, shapes optimal financial policy. We show that the resulting effect is non-monotone in observable outcomes: a higher return can lead to concentrated insider ownership and flexible, aggressive payouts, but it can also lead to dispersed equity ownership and rigid, conservative policies. We close with novel evidence that the implementation of on-chain buyback programs can create stability risks and temporary mispricing.
Presentations: 5th Frankfurt/Mannheim Workshop on Digital Finance, CEPR Fintech and Digital Currencies RPN Annual Meeting 2026, SFA 2026, CBER 2026, Paris Dauphine Tech 4 Finance Conference 2026
Abstract: We develop a dynamic principal-agent model of decentralized platform governance in which tokenholders delegate control rights to self-promoting representatives whose types are initially unknown and whose efforts to build the platform are unobservable. We show that tokenization and vote delegation can create inefficiencies when delegates strategically respond to endogenous changes in the governance environment. In equilibrium, bad delegates exert high effort early on to build reputation. As they grow the platform, delegates also increase the future gains they can extract from it. Observing the platform's growth, tokenholders rationally reduce monitoring, increasing delegates' returns from opportunism and making platform failures most likely after periods of apparent success.